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approach to Russia, stating for instance that, as a key player, Russia must be treated
differently from smaller states such as Romania.71
For such West European states, the expansion of NATO was and remains part
of a goal of enlarging the zone of democracy and of responding positively to the
very strong and persistent requests of the Eastern European states to join. There
were even suspicions in some quarters in the earlier post-Cold War enlargement
that Alliance membership was offered as a compensation for withholding the more
difficult and expensive EU membership.72 West European states, such as France,
therefore, emphasized early on that NATO enlargement was not meant to separate
Russia from Europe, and that they rejected the notion that Europe stopped at the
borders of Russia.73 They strongly emphasized that a Europe without Russia was
not a genuine Europe France even set up a joint France Russia Council.74
Enlargement and the perils of containment 65
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to overstate West European inclusiveness.
True, there are limits to how far Russia itself would like to integrate into European
institutions. Though Vladimir Putin has emphasized the European nature of Russia
and the powerful links to European culture and history,75 he has been coy, at best,
about the possibility of joining NATO. Russian officials, in fact, have indicated
that they do not envision Russian membership in NATO in the near future.76 For
their part though, the West European states such as France and Germany that have
pushed most enthusiastically for stronger relations with Russia have not suggested
even the possibility of NATO membership for it, in the future.
French officials and diplomats may have spoken so readily about the European-
ness, the great importance of Russia and have pressed for negotiations on the
four Common Spaces, but they do not seem any more eager to integrate Russia
into the Alliance than their new Eastern European NATO partners. The French
Ambassador to NATO, for instance, has contended that Russia s natural place is
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).77 Other French officials have
also expressed the view that they could not envision Russia in NATO, as this
would make the Alliance a very different kind of organization.78 Further, German
officials have been no more keen about any possibility of Russian membership.79
Thus, although these West European allies reject Eastern European notions of
containing Russia as anachronistic, the former still appear intent on keeping
Russia substantively separate from the most important military (and economic)
organizations on the continent. Since Germany and France seem in favour of
limiting NATO enlargement to Russia s borders, this raises questions as to just
what role they see for Moscow in terms of a broader regional and international
security strategy.
Still, it is fairly clear that West European states such as France and Germany,
have been disconcerted by the extent of US dominance in the post Cold War
period and by the clumsy way in which the current Bush administration has used
America s overwhelming power. Further, these European countries have also
been irritated by the new NATO members insistence on hard security guarantees
and strong ties to the US. Faced with a unipolar world, France and Germany very
much want to move to multipolarity.80 They and others in Western Europe have
been unhappy about what they see as a diminished ability to influence American
behaviour in international relations. Among the key benefits that West European
states had received from NATO in its first four decades was an ability to socialize
the US to the European way of thinking81 and to develop dense shared experiences
that aided Alliance cohesion.82
As the Bush administration was moving toward military action in Iraq, though
it became quite evident that West European states such as France and Germany
had little influence on the US. Chirac and Schroeder looked for counterweights.
For Chirac especially, Russia seemed to provide opportunities for containing the
US. The problem was that both Chirac and Putin had an exaggerated sense of what
could be achieved jointly. It is as if they concluded that in combining the myths
of France s grandeur and Russia s indispensability, they could create a reality of
global power that would be an effective counterweight to America. Cultivating
66 A. Braun
Russia, however, did not achieve this goal, nor did it have the side benefit of
keeping the Eastern European members in their place. On the contrary, it may
have raised unattainable Russian expectations, further alarmed the new Eastern
European members (who were also annoyed by Chirac s contemptuous directive
to Poland to keep silent) and irritated the US.
Further, in engaging Russia in terms of building counterweights, France and
Germany sought to have the best of all worlds. They would remain free to criticize
Russian domestic policies; keep Russia out of full membership in the key military
and economic organizations in Europe, as noted; remain committed to further
enlargements of NATO; and yet hope to basically have Russia on call to support
French and German policy initiatives. It is noteworthy that even formal institutional
links such as the France Russia Council have been more about atmospherics than
substance.83 In important ways, Western European states have been taking Russia
for granted under the belief that Moscow, faced with growing Chinese power, had
little choice anyway but to turn to Europe.84 It would not be surprising then, if
sooner or later the Russians begin to ask some hard questions as to just how much
benefit they are really getting out of such a relationship, as well as query certain
West European intentions and expectations.
Conclusion
It is not uncommon of course, in international relations, to witness multiple quests
for power, intensive manipulation, or the pursuit of seemingly contradictory
policies. It is also possible that even in very difficult circumstances, countries
and international organizations will somehow muddle through. Further, it should
be recognized that NATO enlargement did not necessarily create the problems
that members, aspirants, and Russia face, but rather, highlighted and amplified
them. Yet, the attempts at a solution through the creation of intricate, multiple,
overlapping containments are too complex, overly ambitious, and too dependent
on an extraordinarily elaborate choreography that neither realpolitik nor discursive
practices suggest will succeed.
Russia buoyed by its success as an oil/gas-based economy and needed partner
in the fight against terrorism, risks over-reaching. Its short-term gains domestically
and in international relations may extract a heavy long-term price. It is unlikely
to realize the Primakovian fantasies of containing, manipulating, and isolating
smaller neighbours and susceptible larger states (or organizations) while it rebuilds
domestic strength and moves to regain global power. Russian/Soviet history
shows that there is no long-term substitute for building democracy, a viable
market system, balanced economic growth and integrating into the community of
democratic states. In the case of the Eastern European states, they are not likely
to succeed in building walls, segregating Russia, and constructing buffer zones.
They will also need to recognize the irony of self-fulfilling prophecies and how
their actions can damage the prospects for stability and democracy in Russia. For
certain key West European states, they need to come to the realization that they
may well be better off by working on an equitable and sustainable partnership with [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]